



casa

Common Agricultural
and wider bioeconomy
reSearch Agenda

D1.5 Impact report on representation and inclusion inSCAR 2016-2019

(Progression on Representation
and Inclusion in SCAR
an impact study)



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The overall objective of CASA, a Coordination and Support Action (CSA), is a **consolidated common agricultural and wider bioeconomy research agenda** within the European Research Area.

CASA will achieve this by bringing the Standing Committee on Agricultural Research (SCAR), which has already contributed significantly to this objective in the past, to the next level of performance as a research policy think tank. CASA will efficiently strengthen the strengths and compensate for the insufficiencies of SCAR and thus help it evolve further into “SCAR plus”.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AC	Associated Countries
BSW	Bioeconomy Strategic Working Group
CASA	Common Agricultural and wider bioeconomy reSearch Agenda
CWG	Collaborative Working Group
CWG AHW	Collaborative Working Group Animal Health and Welfare
CWG SAP	Collaborative Working Group Sustainable Animal Production
EC	European Commission
ERA	European Research Area
EU	European Union
EU-13	European Union Member States that became member after 2004
EU-15	European Union Member States that became member before 2004
FG	Foresight Group
GERD	Gross Expenditure on Research and Development
KIS	Knowledge and Innovation Systems
MLE	Mutual Learning Exercise
P2P	Public-to-Public partnership
PPP	Public-Private Partnership
R&I	Research and Innovation
SCAR	Standing Committee on Agricultural Research
SG	Steering Group (of SCAR)
SWG	Strategic Working Group
SWG AKIS	Strategic Working Group on Knowledge and innovation Systems
SWG ARCH	Strategic Working Group in European Agricultural Research towards greater impact on global challenges
SWG FISH	Strategic Working Group Fisheries and Aquaculture Research
SWG FOREST	Strategic Working Group on Forests and Forestry Research and Innovation
SWG FS	Strategic Working Group Food Systems
T&S	Travel and Sustenance
WG	Working Group (of SCAR)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Standing Committee on Agricultural Research (SCAR) coordinates agricultural research in the broader bioeconomy remit between European Member States and associate countries. It is a respected source of advice for its members and the European Commission, as well as a major driver for coordination of national research programmes on agriculture and the larger bioeconomy. In order to strengthen and support SCAR, several activities were designed to support SCAR in addressing a number of several central challenges described in the 2015 *'Reflection Paper on the Role of the Standing Committee on Agricultural Research'* (SCAR, 2015). One of these challenges focused on Member State representation and inclusion. In 2017, an *Analysis of the key factors of involvement and representativeness* (Te Boekhorst, 2017) study was performed, in which the perceived underrepresentation of the newer Member States (EU-13) and Associated Countries, as well as the Eastern and Southern European countries in the SCAR Working Groups was confirmed. In addition, the study identified key challenges for representation.

In 2019, a new study was conducted with a main focus on inclusion and possible strategies for SCAR to widen participation. In addition, a follow-up of the 2017 analysis of representation was conducted. This follow-up showed a continuing under-representation of EU-13 and associate countries in SCAR. Longer-term data analysis shows a clear increase of country participation from EU-13 countries. Qualitative data suggest both active involvement and leadership of several EU-13 countries has increased. Country participation from associate countries remains roughly at the same, low level when comparing 2019 with 2016. With respect to organisational representation and participants roles, there is a substantial increase visible in Plenary officials that are from a Ministry or closely affiliated organisation. This increase is fully explained by EU-13 and AC countries that have appointed Plenary officials working within a Ministry or closely related affiliation instead of a delegate working in science.

Arrangements that improve inclusion

Country representation, or 'widening' receives a lot of attention from the European Commission as participation of EU-13 in European Research and Innovation policy design is expected to stimulate improvement of national Knowledge and Innovation Systems. This improvement has been a long-standing European Union goal expected to drive national progress, economic development and social cohesion. Representation in SCAR is an opportunity for countries to advocate national priorities and connect with (research) networks. Stimulating participation requires the creation of inclusive environments; arrangements that enable and actively stimulate participation. Such arrangements need to be open and accessible to functional and descriptive representatives, should enable participants to meaningfully engage and influence decisions and should minimise external and internal forms of exclusion. Examples of enabling arrangements in the context of SCAR are found in opportunities to **bring attention for its work to the national level** and thus engage national policy and decision-makers. This can be done through dedicated events held during a countries Presidency, but also national SCAR meetings are considered as a good way of catching national attention. Other arrangements that support an inclusive environment revolve around the content around which SCAR work is organised. The **relevance and urgency (at the national level) of the themes** covered by SCAR and its Working Groups, determines to a large extent whether countries participate. This translates to the themes of the Working Groups, as well as to relevant policy

developments, such as the development of national policies in frame of the European Bioeconomy Strategy.

Strengths, challenges and suggestions for improvement of inclusiveness in SCAR

SCAR is quite **open and accessible to functional and descriptive representatives** in all bodies and active participation is greatly valued and supported. Participants are **enabled to meaningfully engage and influence decisions**. It is exactly this open environment that is one of the greatly valued characteristics of SCAR. With respect to content, it is important to realise that the notion '*form follows content*', however trivial it may seem, needs to be at the heart of any measure, action, idea and intention to increase country participation in SCAR. Topics of the Working Groups need to stay relevant and in line with (or ahead of) the latest policy developments. An inclusive arrangement ensures that relevant national issues are being discussed, and in addition that publication of results is more appropriately timed to be able to feed into the European and national policy process cycles. SCAR and its Working Groups are quite successful at identifying content that drives participation. In addition, a major challenge is ensuring a good position in the current public-to-public landscape that enables SCAR to continue addressing national priorities of its members at the European level. Improvements should include mechanisms that ensure the uptake of SCAR outcomes at the national level and a continuous strong focus on ensuring relevant themes being addressed by SCAR.

Minimising external and internal forms of exclusion is to a large extent lifting barriers for participation. This needs structural attention from Member States, Associate Countries and the European Commission. Resources restrictions will continue to play a role in country participation. The additional financial support offered to SCAR through the CASA CSA was highly appreciated and recognised as contributing to a more inclusive SCAR. In terms of enabling newcomers in SCAR quicker to meaningfully engage and influence decisions, results with the mentoring programme are very positive. Challenges will remain in assuring structural resources for creating inclusive environments. This refers not only to financial resources for T&S reimbursement, but also for structural support for the Working Groups, and support to continue with much needed studies. Ideas to improve inclusion include the establishment of a EC-funded 'widening SCAR' fellowship programme that enables targeted Member States to appoint additional human resources for concrete, dedicated tasks for SCAR, like mapping exercises. Such a programme could also include training new SCAR members.

A final general recommendation on approaches to improve country participation relates on the individual countries' particular context. There are very specific reasons why countries choose to participate or remain absent in SCAR bodies. Any approach to improve participation needs to have specific reasons and take the national context into account. It is, therefore, highly recommended to explicitly involve targeted countries in design and execution of such approaches for their country.

1. INTRODUCTION

In order to strengthen and support the Standing Committee on Agricultural Research (SCAR), in 2016 a Coordination and Support Action (CSA) started under the acronym CASA. Its goals were to address several central challenges for SCAR, described in the 2015 *Reflection Paper on the Role of the Standing Committee on Agricultural Research* (SCAR, 2015). One of these challenges focused on Member State representation and inclusion. Several activities were conducted, starting in 2017, with an *Analysis of the key factors of involvement and representativeness* (Te Boekhorst, 2017). It confirmed the perceived underrepresentation of the newer Member States (EU-13) and Associated Countries and the Eastern and Southern European countries in the SCAR Working Groups. The report also identified key challenges for representation (Box 1).

Box 1: Key challenges for participation in SCAR

I Resources restraints in terms of time, money, and people forces Member States to prioritise participation to those Working Groups that deal with topics of national priority. Options to negate these effects: i.e. to create a more inclusive and welcoming environment could constitute of reducing the number of meetings, the use telecommunication tools, compensate travel costs and organising meetings outside of Brussels.

II The relative unfamiliarity that newcomers may still have with the European Union and its governance mechanisms; a less clear-cut challenge, especially where it involves prioritising and organisation at the national levels. Return on investment in European cooperation is a long-term process that requires substantial attention for both transnational cooperation and for creating structures that can coordinate at the national level. It requires a national strategic view on what the value of cooperation is for a country in both policy influence as well as cash return on investment from large European funding programmes such as the Framework Programmes. It also needs a European environment that allows countries to catch up with the front-runners in European cooperation at both policy and scientific levels.

III SCAR could benefit from more awareness and visibility of its work and the impact of that work at both national and European level. Timing of products (e.g. policy advices) is essential in order to increase visibility. It was also concluded that new participants in SCAR could benefit from a learning environment or mentoring system that capitalises on the experience of their colleagues, thus supporting more quick and effective participation and reduction of disappointment due to unrealistic expectations.

Following the SCAR 2017 conference in Tallinn, CASA was requested to produce a follow up on the above-mentioned study by the end of the support action in 2019. The follow up should include an update on Member State representation, but also focus more on inclusion and investigate strategies for widening participation. The main questions for the study are:

- 1) How has country participation developed in the Working Groups of SCAR since 2016?
- 2) Are there successful strategies for inclusion of countries in SCAR?
- 3) Did perceptions or ideas on representation and inclusion change?

2. INCLUSION OF MEMBER STATES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN RESEARCH AREA

2.1 Inclusion in terms of democratic network governance

In the 2017 report on representation (Te Boekhorst, 2017), inclusion was defined in broad strokes as *“the deliberate act of welcoming diversity and creating an environment in which all are able to thrive and succeed. Inclusion thus is about the actual steps that are taken to enable representation.”* This definition followed a line of reasoning in which representation is defined as *“the possibility of those affected by an outcome of a decision, or action (or report or policy advice), to have an influence on that outcome”*, a reasoning that has been coined as ‘democracy of the affected’ by scholars such as Eckersley (2000) and Dryzek (2007), and variations like the ‘All-Affected’ (Näsström, 2011) or ‘Symmetry Principle’ (Agné, 2006). In addition, its applicability for country participation in Comitology such as SCAR was argued.

Following the line of reasoning of a ‘democracy of the affected’, inclusion becomes a central notion, that, according to Hendriks (2008), addresses an important aspect of *democratic accountability* in a society where decision makers are not necessarily bound by electorates or administrative procedures e.g. even in absence of a formal voting or election procedure, as is the case for SCAR. Paying attention to inclusion is argued to *“refocuses our democratic attention on inequities -in both resources and opportunities- that can be created when marginalized perspectives are excluded from decision-making procedures”*; inclusive arrangements increase attention for the needs of a minority. Erman (2016) regards representation, equality and inclusion as three essential aspects of democracy.

Policy literature on inclusion and representation also provides a number of instrumental reasons for considering inclusiveness in networks. If concerns are taken on board in decision-making or formulating policy advice, in an early stage, it may create new insights and ideas that can subsequently be used in the (policy) process and it may facilitate implementation of policies. Implementation of policies in a strict sense, falls outside of the remit of SCAR. Its advice and products though, do have the ability to provide strong arguments for policy development towards the European Commission and the national governments in the Member States. The more inclusive such arguments, the stronger its legitimisation. In this study the focus is on arrangements that enable inclusive network governance. Hendriks (2008) argues that such arrangements should have the following characteristics. They should be open and accessible to functional and descriptive representatives from potentially affected publics. Arrangements should enable participants to meaningfully engage and influence decisions. And in addition to the two above-mentioned characteristics, such arrangements should minimize external and internal forms of exclusion.

2.2 Inclusion and widening participation as European Union goal

Inclusion and participation of its Member States is a broad and cross-cutting priority for the proper functioning of the European Union, also included in its Research and Innovation policies. *“Scientific talent is everywhere in Europe but in some parts of the Union it does not have fertile ground to*

develop. We want to change this and that is why we are investing €900 million from the EU's Research and Innovation Programme in developing partnerships and setting up centres of excellence that will help talented researchers reach their full potential". With this quote from the Commissioner for Research, Science and Innovation; Carlos Moedas, the European Commission recently announced investments for new centres of excellence in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Portugal, to form partnerships with leading scientific institutions across Europe (EC, 2019). It is the latest effort to improve Research and Innovation (R&I) capacities in European countries performing less than average.

One of the European Union's long-standing goals has been the improvement of research and innovation capabilities of its European Member States, thus enhancing progress, economic development and social cohesion across them. A central underpinning notion is that well-functioning Knowledge and Innovation Systems (KIS) will improve social and economic wellbeing in a country. A series of efforts have been made to both decrease the gap between well-performing and less-performing systems, as well as improving KIS in general. Two of the largest support mechanisms for developing R&I capabilities are the Framework Programmes and the European Structural Investment Funds. Where the former is a source of competitive funding that promotes 'Excellence', the latter is a source of funding that supports 'Cohesion'. When applied together, these mechanisms are expected to improve national KIS development and narrow the R&I gap between countries.

In particular (but not limited to) the newer Member States (EU-13) are not performing as well in the Framework Programmes as the EU-15 does. Recent data, collated in frame of a policy support facility action; the '*Mutual Learning Exercise on Widening Participation and Strengthening Synergies*' confirms this once again (EC, 2018). The analysis shows that even though EU-13 countries are not too dissimilar from EU-15 countries in terms of capturing H2020 contributions when expressed as a proportion of Gross Expenditure on Research and Development (GERD), but that this GERD is much lower in EU-13 countries compared to EU-15 countries. As a consequence, actual levels of H2020 contributions are very small compared to those captured by the EU-15. The report states that: "*Weak national capabilities mean that the EU-13 countries miss out on many of the opportunities that Framework programmes provide to improve R&I performance*". The report also stresses the importance of synergies between Framework Programmes and ESIF, as especially EU-13 countries depend on this (EC, 2018). In 2018, the Science and Technology Options Assessment's Scientific Foresight Unit presented a study on *Overcoming Innovation Gaps in the EU-13 Member States* (STOA, 2018), analysing EU-13 performance and testing a series of hypotheses on the underlying causes for underrepresentation. The report describes underrepresentation of EU-13 as a complex problem for which the explanations are most likely country-specific.

The most important aspects or explanations for underrepresentation are also key challenges reported in the 2017 study on representation and inclusion (Te Boekhorst, 2017). They include lack of resources; in terms of national R&I investments and investments in European cooperation; as well as lack of professional contacts and networks and financial means to initiate such contacts. In addition, the report describes how lack of knowledge about processes (advocacy at the European level and the idea that Framework Programme funding is more administratively complex than Structural Funds), discourage some countries to direct energy to participation in European networks.

3. SCAR IN THE EUROPEAN BIOECONOMY RESEARCH LANDSCAPE¹

3.1 What is SCAR?

The Standing Committee on Agricultural Research (SCAR) was established in 1974. At that time, it was tasked with enhancing coordination of agricultural research and reported back to both the European Parliament and Council. SCAR was given a revised mandate by the Council in 2005. The revision included a provision to give advice to the Commission and Member States on the coordination of agricultural research in Europe. The European Commission's Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD) at this time took over responsibilities for the SCAR Secretary from the Agriculture Directorate-General (DG AGRI). The revised mandate also entailed a broadened remit for SCAR to oversee the 'broader' bioeconomy. The changing role of SCAR reflected significant changes in the agricultural research policy agenda over the years as well as the ambitions of the European Union to shape the European Research Area (ERA). In the years following its revised mandate, SCAR has become a respected source of advice as well as a major driver for coordination of national research programmes on agriculture and the larger bioeconomy. SCAR supported in shaping the beginnings of the ERA and developed into an important platform for alignment of agricultural research. Following a critical review on the challenges SCAR was facing in 2015 (SCAR, 2015), the EC decided to use the CSA instrument to support SCAR in its further development. At present, the ERA in SCAR's remit is quite densely populated with Public-to-Public (P2P) initiatives and with Horizon Europe approaching, SCAR is challenged to consider its role in this cooperation landscape.

3.2 SCAR members and governance

SCAR represents thirty-seven countries, including all European Union Member States and nine Associated Countries (see Annex 1). It operates through a number of Working Groups (WG) that each have their own mandate and responsibilities. Each group reports to the Plenary meeting of the official national delegates, usually a representative of the national Ministry that oversees Agriculture or a closely affiliated organisation. The **SCAR Plenary** is the governing body that decides on the creation of dedicated Working Groups or any other initiative proposed by the EC, the Member States or the Working Groups. Such initiatives could include ad-hoc Working Groups or a task force. Draft policy papers from the Working Groups are discussed in the Plenary which then may decide on further actions. These meetings foremost provide a platform for discussions between the Member Countries and the European Commission to discuss on strategic direction and development of European research and innovation policies. The **SCAR Steering Group** (SG) consists of the Plenary delegates and / or national officials nominated by the Plenary members. It is co-chaired by the EC and the Member State in the EU Presidency chair. Meeting on a regular basis (five to six times a year), the SG plans the Plenary meetings, prepares discussion papers and documents up for debate and follows up on decisions made in the Plenary. The SG supports the Working Groups, the establishment of new ones, and forms the overseeing body for progress in the individual Working Groups and Foresight process. New Working Groups may be established around emerging topics prioritised by Member States or the EC.

¹ This chapter is a shortened, up-to-date description about SCAR and its Working Groups. A more extended description was provided in the 2017 report on *Representation and Inclusion*.

All **Working Groups** have EC staff actively involved. Group membership is voluntary and attendance at meetings has to be funded through national sources. Groups still have a rather high level of autonomy in how they operate, but this has become more formalised over the past years. Almost all groups have specific Terms of Reference for a limited timeframe that needs to be approved by the Plenary. The Terms of Reference provides the group with its mandate. In addition, each group works with an annual 'rolling work plan'. In some cases, individual countries have made resources available to a group to support coordination efforts or expert input. From 2016 to 2019 such support has also been made available by the EC through CASA.

3.3 SCAR Working Groups

Foresight Group

The Foresight study is an important and revolving task of SCAR and seen as one of the core deliverables. Currently, the Fifth SCAR Foresight study is ongoing as experts are carrying out foresight activities and write the Foresight report that will be published in 2020. The Foresight Group is a special Working Group of SCAR SG members that work together with the EC for selecting and contracting the experts and enabling the Working Groups to deliver input in different steps of the process. The Steering Group is responsible for communication and dissemination activities of the outcomes. Funding for the experts is provided from the H2020 budget.

Collaborative Working Groups

SCAR Collaborative Working Groups (CWG) have been an important SCAR instrument since 2005. Its members typically are research funders that explore possible multilateral collaborations. The results of such groups often are agreements on common ways of working and the development of common research agenda's. Many of the CWGs have led to ERA-NETs. There are two Collaborative Working Groups currently active: Animal Health and Welfare (AHW), and Sustainable Animal Production (SAP). Both groups have been involved in the preparation of past and current ERA-NETs.

CWG Animal Health and Welfare started in 2005 in the slipstream of the big outbreaks of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD). The CWG evolved into forming the European Regional Network of STAR-IDAZ, now operating as the STAR-IDAZ International Research Consortium on Animal Health. The groups' activities are in close connection with relevant ERA-NETs (EMIDA and ANIWHWA) and the STAR-IDAZ IRC and include a wide range of joint programming activities that include a joint Strategic Research Agenda, joint funding of collaborative projects and maintenance of publication and programmes databases. Members contribute actively to the maintenance of DISCONTTOOLS as a freely accessible tool for research targeting and programming, which maintains a permanently updated assessment of the existing knowledge and analysis of knowledge gaps on a large number of animal infectious or parasitic diseases (51 at present) by the collective work of international experts. The CWG AHW is also the only group that includes a member outside of SCAR (Russia).

CWG Sustainable Animal Production parallels CWG AHW in the area of sustainable animal production. It was set up after the 2013 Bioeconomy report (EC, 2013), to improve coordination and collaboration in the area of sustainable animal production. The group has resulted in the currently active Sustainable Animal Production ERA-NET SusAn.

Strategic Working Groups

Strategic Working Groups (SWG) were established as fora to discuss strategic matters for which there is insufficient time or opportunity in the Plenary meetings. Such strategic matters usually cover broader issues and many groups focus on formulating research policy advice. There are six Strategic Working Groups currently active: agricultural knowledge and innovation systems (SWG AKIS), fisheries and aquaculture research (SWG FISH), Bioeconomy (BSW), forestry research and innovation (SWG Forest), European Agricultural Research towards greater impact on global challenges (SWG ARCH) and Food Systems (SWG FS).

Agricultural Knowledge and Innovation Systems (SWG AKIS) started in 2010, at that time not as a Strategic, but as a Collaborative Working Group. Its establishment was driven by a number of questions regarding a well-functioning knowledge triangle that included and integrated multiple knowledge systems. SCAR AKIS became a Strategic Working Group in 2014 at the launch of its third mandate and is currently working towards its 5th mandate. SWG AKIS has been instrumental in (co-)developing the European Innovation Platform (EIP AGRI), conducted a Foresight, organises workshops and produces policy papers.

In 2012, the **Strategic Working Group on Fisheries and Aquaculture Research (SWG FISH)** was established to support successful implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy 2012 and the development of Horizon 2020. From its start, SWG FISH clearly defined itself as policy-driven group that consists mainly of representatives from the ministries of Fisheries and Aquaculture or are in close contact. The group includes in its work aspects of aquaculture developments, regionalisation, ecosystem approach, climate change and increasing demands for monitoring data and spatial planning. More recently they also include aquatic animal health and welfare matters, in which they worked together with AHW CWG to produce a report on fish welfare (Manfrin, 2018). In contrast to the other Strategic Working Groups, SWG FISH has no end to its current mandate.

The **Bioeconomy Strategic Working Group (BSW)**, initiated in 2012 as a merger between the SCAR Biomass SWG and SCAR Biorefineries CWG. The group discusses on how renewable bio-resources can be sustainably produced for the bioeconomy. It covers a large range of topics ranging from the production side of renewable biological resources to biomass potential of different European regions and also addresses how the implementation of the Bioeconomy strategy impacts upon agriculture, forestry, fisheries and aquacultures. The BSW also discusses the relationship of the Bioeconomy policy to other policy areas, different stakeholders and links circular economy and national Bioeconomy strategies to the European one. Their recent activities include a policy brief

on the future of the European Bioeconomy Strategy (BSW, 2017) and the development of a Strategic Knowledge and Innovation Agenda (Soini, 2018).

The **Agricultural research towards greater impact on global Challenges Strategic Working Group** (SWG ARCH) was put in place in 2013 following two ERA-ARD networks. It was recognised that there was need for more structural cooperation in Europe on the topic of agricultural research for development (ARD). ARCH SWG was initiated as a joint effort between SCAR and the European Initiative for Agricultural Research for Development (EIARD); a permanent informal ARD policy coordination platform between the European Commission, Member States of the European Union, Switzerland and Norway. ARCH has a policy advisory and agenda setting role. Their latest activities include a Joint workshop with SWG AKIS and SWG Food Systems on programming Research and Innovation for Improved Impact in April 2018.

In 2014, the **Strategic Working Group on Forestry** was established. In 2016 the group refocused its mandate aiming at *'strengthen coordination of national research and innovation between EU, Member States and stakeholders for the development of a coherent and ambitious EU forest based research area'* that is able to meet the challenges of forest adaptation to, and mitigation of climate changes. It operates in close connection to several ERA-NETs in their focus. A recent example of the groups' work includes a joint event with the COST network in 2018: *'Climate Change and Forest Systems – New horizons for research and innovation'*.

The **Strategic Working Group Food Systems** (SWG FS) is the newest WG, initiated in 2016 at the specific request of the European Commission to strengthen coordination on this theme and support its development of the Food 2030 initiative. Food SWG is expected to 'adopt a wide Food Systems approach similar to the one in FOOD 2030 and include the entire 'value chain' from inputs to consumer intake, - and back. The group links with other relevant Working Groups and initiatives, in particular the relevant JPIs and the Coordination and Support Action Fit4Food. The group aims to support the FOOD 2030 policy framework as well as the Bioeconomy Strategy review, and in the broader context the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals and COP21 commitments. The Working Group held its final workshop under their first mandate in May 2019 on *'Diversifying Food Systems in the Pursuit of Sustainable Food Production and Healthy Diets'*.

4. METHODOLOGY

4.1 Data collection and clustering

The data used in this study was collected in 2016 and in 2019. The 2016 data was also used as basis for a study published 2017 (Te Boekhorst, 2017). The collected data consists of lists of Working Group and Steering Group participants and attendance lists of Working Group meetings from 2012 to 2019. All WG chairs or co-chairs and the SCAR secretary were asked to provide their lists of participants (countries partaking in a Working Group and Steering Group) and attendance lists of meetings. Almost all groups responded to this request. The data varied greatly in detail, but all groups sent in lists covering 2016 and 2018/2019. Data was aggregated and anonymised.

Aggregated data was clustered in subsets. The subsets are different ways in which countries in SCAR can be grouped: according to political association with the EU, R&I performance or geographical distribution (Box 2).

Political association

Countries can relate in several ways to the European Union. They can be part of it or not. In case there is no formal membership of the EU, countries can have a candidate status, be associated with the EU or have any other kind of relation. All countries that participate in SCAR and belong to the latter group are recognised as associate countries (AC) under the Framework Programme regulations (EC)². Members of the EU that participate in SCAR are grouped as either 'EU-15'; countries that have been part of the EU for a long time, or 'EU-13'; countries that gained EU membership in 2004 or later. Russia, member of the Animal Health and Welfare Collaborative Working Group, is left out of the analyses because this country is not a Member Country of SCAR.

Research and Innovation Performance

Data was also analysed in terms of research and innovation performance³. The H2020 Spreading Excellence and Widening Participation Work Programme used the 2013 Composite indicator of Research Excellence⁴ (with a corrective threshold of 70% of the EU average) to select 'Low R&I performing' or 'Widening' countries, as they fall behind in R&I performance compared to the other EU Member States and associate countries. In this report we refer to those countries as lower performing countries (LPC) and to the others as higher performing countries (HPC).

²All five candidate EU-member countries (Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey) are part of SCAR. Of the eleven other Associated Countries under H2020, four are SCAR members (Switzerland, Iceland, Israel, Norway).

³H2020 Spreading Excellence and Widening Participation Work programme 2018-2020

⁴http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/pdf/state-of-the-union/2012/innovation_union_progress_at_country_level_2013.pdf

Geographical distribution

A third way of grouping countries is by looking at the regional distribution of SCAR members. Regional division, and hence climatological differences between regions may affect priorities between countries from different geographical regions. The geographical regions are according to the United Nations Statistic Division⁵.

Box 2: subsets of countries

Political association

EU-15: AT, BE, DE, DK, EL, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, SE, UK

EU-13: BG, CY, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, MT, PL, RO, SK, SI

AC: AL, CH, IL, IS, ME, MK, NO, RS, TR

OTHER: RU

R&I performance

LPC: AL, BG, CY, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, LU, ME, MK, MT, PL, PT, RO, RS, SK, SI, TR

HPC: AT, BE, CH, DE, DK, EL, ES, FI, FR, IE, IL, IS, IT, NL, NO, SE, UK

Geographical distribution

Northern Europe: DK, EE, FI, IE, IS, LT, LV, NO, SE, UK

Western Europe: AT, BE, CH, DE, FR, LU, NL

Eastern Europe: BG, CZ, HU, PL, RO, SK

Southern-Europe: EL, ES, IT, HR, ME, MK, MT, PT, RS, SI

Non-European: CY, IL, TR

4.2 Data analysis and topics

The major topics that were analysed are *country* and *organisational representation*, and where possible, *participants' roles*. This is in line with the analysis conducted in 2017. With the additional data collected in 2019, the 2017 analysis was extended and new long-term analyses on country representation in Working Groups were conducted. There is a distinction between theoretical participation (a country representative is formally member of a Working Group) and actual participation (attendance at meetings). Where possible, these differences were also analysed, based on the data provided. The data also allowed for longer-term analysis of the development of representation in the Working Groups and SCAR Steering Group. Where 2019 data is compared to another year in the analysis, 2016 is taken, because this year is the base-line in the 2017 study. The most important limitation of the quantitative part of this study is the variability between the Working Groups' participation lists. These lists (countries partaking in a Working Group or the Steering Group) are in some groups extended to mailing lists (and include a broader set of people). In case of doubt, either the WG chairs were contacted or only the attendance lists of meetings were included in the analysis.

In addition to country participation, the lists contain information on the representing roles of participants. Four major groups were categorised: Policy representatives (P), Funders (F), Experts (E) and Stakeholders (S). Policy representatives usually are delegates from a national Ministry or individuals that are specifically mandated to participate, by a national Ministry. Funders typically

⁵ <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/>

are employees of a national funding organisation. If they are employed at a national Ministry, they are treated as Policy representatives in the analysis. Experts (E) typically are researchers that are involved in groups because of their specific expertise. They may participate in Working Groups on their personal title (because of the relevance to their own work) or sent as a country representative. In the latter case, there is a formal appointment (and sometimes mandate) from a national Ministry or a national funding organisation. Stakeholders (S) are typically spokespersons of a group that has relevance or interest in the specific topic. These can be representatives from P2P's, H2020 projects, or relevant international organisations.

4.3 Interviews and synthesis

In addition to the data retrieved from the lists, a number of semi-structured interviews were conducted. When conducting a semi-structured interview, a specific set of questions is used as a guideline for the conversation, but allowing for deviation from these questions. The interview questions were prepared in advance and specifically targeted at the following groups: 1) all Working Group (co-)chairs; 2) selected Steering Group members and 3) selected Plenary delegates (Annex 3). The interviews were conducted through telephone calls, face to face, or sent in written. All interviewees were allowed to read the interview transcript and make corrections and additions. The qualitative information retrieved from the interviews was used to resolve uncertainties in the quantitative data and acquire additional information. Quantitative data analysis was conducted both at the WG level as well as aggregated per year. Qualitative data was aggregated and used for a synthesis. All primary interview data is treated confidentially.

5. RESULTS OF PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION ANALYSIS

5.1 Country representation in SCAR Plenary and Steering Group

SCAR consists of thirty-seven countries. Annex 1 provides a list of SCAR countries with attributes including year of becoming member of the EU (EU-13, EU-15 or AC), how they are distributed geographically in Europe and their R&I performance category. Box 3 gives some key numbers of how countries in SCAR are distributed according to these attributes. Annex 4 shows this information in figures.

Box 3: Key numbers on distribution of countries in SCAR

- EU-15 countries make up 41% of SCAR, EU-13 countries 35% and the nine associated countries account for 24%;
- 54% of the countries in SCAR are Lower Performing Countries, 46% are Higher Performing Countries;
- 19% are Western European countries (7), 27% Northern European (10), 16% is Eastern European (6), 30% Southern European (11) and 8% is non-European (3).

A first analysis concerns the country representation of countries in the SCAR Steering Group. Because the Steering Group meetings are open to all plenary members, and not all countries appoint formal Steering Group delegates, representation in the Steering Group is difficult to analyse. In addition, there is no long-term data available on actual participation per meeting. What is available, are lists of formally appointed Steering Group members. In both 2016 and 2019, 18 countries had appointed formal representatives (Annex 4). This is half of all countries in SCAR Plenary. In 2016, of the countries that had formally appointed Steering Group members, 11 were from EU-15 countries (61%), 5 from EU-13 countries (28%) and 2 from AC (11%). In 2019; 11 (61%) were from EU-15 countries, 4 from EU-13 (22%) and 3 from AC (17%). The EU-15 share in the Steering Group is much larger than can be expected from country composition in SCAR (Plenary) and increases.

When comparing participation in terms of R&I performance, data shows no improvement of Lower Performing Countries to the SG from 2016 to 2019. Higher Performing Countries have appointed even more SG representatives than in 2016, reflecting even less so what should be expected based on the proportion in SCAR (54%). In 2016, Lower Performing countries had a share of 33% in the Steering Group. This share dropped to 28% in 2019. Also the geographical distribution in the SG remains rather different from SCAR composition. The largest disparities between the regional distribution of SCAR and the SG are in 2019 still visible between the (combined) Northwest-European share and the Southern European one. In SCAR the combined Northwest-European is 36%, while in the SG this is 67%. The Southern European share in SCAR is 30% and in the SG 11% in 2019.

5.2 Country representation in SCAR Working Groups

From 2016 to 2019, the average number of countries participating in a SCAR Working Group, has increased from 18 to 20 out of the 37 SCAR countries (average across all Working Groups). Based

on the proportion in SCAR, EU-15 countries should make up 40.5% of the participants, EU-13 countries, 35.1% and Associated Countries 24.3%. In 2016, EU-15 countries have a share of 66.0%, EU-13 countries 21.6% and Associated Countries 12.5%. These shares have changed slightly in 2019 to 64.8%, 24.2% and 11.0% respectively.

Tables 1a and 1b show participation of EU-15, EU-13 and AC countries in number of Working Groups in 2016 and 2019. In 2018 all EU-13 countries participate in at least one Working Group.

WG participation 2016	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
EU-15	-	-	-	2	2	-	1	4	6
EU-13	2	4	1	1	3	-	1	1	-
AC	4	2	1	-	-	-	1	1	-

WG participation 2019	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
EU-15	-	-	1	-	-	2	2	4	6
EU-13	-	4	2	-	3	1	2	1	-
AC	4	2	1	-	-	-	1	1	-

Table 1a: 2016 participation in number of Working Groups across political association.

Table 1b: 2019 participation in number of Working Groups across political association.

Figures 1a to 1c show the development of country participation in the Working Groups from 2012 to 2019. The largest increase in participating countries is seen in the EU-13 group (figure 3b): in 2016, on average 4 countries participated in a Working Group (average of all Working Groups); in 2019 this average increased to almost 6. Participation of EU-15 and AC countries remains more or less stable from 2016 to 2019.




Figure 1a. Development of EU-15 participation in the Working Groups of SCAR from 2012 to 2019. AV=average participation. Y-axes show number of EU-15 countries in a Working Group (maximum = 15).




Figure 1b. Development of EU-13 participation in the Working Groups of SCAR from 2012 to 2019. AV=average participation. Y-axes show number of EU-13 countries in a Working Group (maximum = 13).




Figure 1c. Development of AC participation in the Working Groups of SCAR from 2012 to 2019. AV=average participation. Y-axes show number of AC countries in a Working Group (maximum = 9).

The underrepresentation of both EU-13 and AC countries in SCAR bodies, as well as underrepresentation of the Eastern-European and Southern-European regions, is still visible in 2018 and 2019 (figures 2 and 3). Longer-term data analysis does show a steady increase of Working Group participation of EU-13 countries (Table 3: from 2.6 in 2016, to 3.4 in 2019). In addition, Working Group participation of countries in the in Eastern European (from 3.0 in 2016, to 4.2 in 2019) and Southern European regions (from 2.3 in 2016 to 2.7 in 2019) slightly increases.

A smaller (from 6.4 in 2016, to 6.7 in 2019) increase of EU-15 participation is also visible over time. Within regions, comparing 2016 and 2019 numbers also show this increase in especially EU-13 countries. Participation of Associated Countries stays similar from 2016 to 2019.




Figure 2a: Development of average country participation for EU-15, EU-13 and AC countries in the Working Groups of SCAR. Number of Working Groups is corrected for the amount of groups in a certain year (100% in 2013 = 2 Working Groups, 100% in 2018 = 8 Working Groups).




Figure 2b: Development of average country participation for Higher Performing Countries (HPC) and Lower Performing Countries (LPC) in the Working Groups of SCAR. Number of Working Groups is corrected for the amount of groups in a certain year (100% in 2013 = 2 Working Groups, 100% in 2018 = 8 Working Groups).




Figure 3: Development of average country participation per region in the Working Groups of SCAR. Number of Working Groups is corrected for the amount of groups in a certain year (100% in 2013 = 2 Working Groups, in 2018 = 8 Working Groups).

Table 2 Average participation of EU-13, EU-15 and AC countries per region in 2016 and 2019

2016	WE	NE	EE	SE	NO-E
EU-15	6.17	7.20	none	5.75	none
EU-13	none	4.76	3.00	0.67	0.00
AC	2.00	3.50	none	0.00	4.00

2019	WE	NE	EE	SE	NO-E
EU-15	6.5	7.00	none	6.5	none
EU-13	none	4.67	4.33	1.33	1.00
AC	2.00	3.50	none	0.00	4.00

The table shows more detailed country participation per region in 2016 and 2018. None = no countries from that group.

Table 3: average Working Group participation for EU-13, EU-15 and AC countries per year. NWG = Number of Working Groups in that year where data is available from.

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
EU-15	1.4	3.1	2.9	6.4	6.5	6.7	6.7
EU-13	0.2	0.7	0.8	2.6	2.8	3.5	3.4
AC (9)	0.3	1.1	1.0	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.9
NWG	2	2	4	8	8	8	8

5.3 Organisational representation and participants roles

Organisational representation in SCAR has been an ongoing discussion for especially Working Group composition. There is common agreement that national representatives in the Plenary and Steering Group should be policy makers or at the very least be explicitly mandated by national Ministries.

Plenary

Compared to 2016, more EU-13 and AC countries have appointed policy delegates to the Plenary. In 2016, in EU-15 countries almost all Plenary officials were from Ministries (93%). In EU-13 countries and Associated Countries this was about half (EU-13: 44%; AC: 55%). In 2019, EU-15 countries still have 93% of the Plenary delegates from Ministries. Plenary officials from EU-13 and AC countries are increasingly appointed Ministry delegates in 2019. 69% of the Plenary delegates from EU-13 countries are Ministry officials, and from AC countries this is 67%. When including the Plenary substitutes, the percentages even increase to 85% for EU-13 and 78% for AC countries respectively.

In 2016, countries that had an expert mandated to the Plenary, were all participating in 4 or less Working Groups of SCAR in 2016. In 2019, the countries with an expert in the Plenary, participated in 5 or less Working Groups. In 2019, almost all (94%) Plenary officials from Ministries or closely related bodies are from a Ministry or affiliated to the Ministry that oversees Agriculture (In 2016: 83%). One delegate is from a Ministry that oversees Science and one is from a permanent representation in Brussels.

Working Groups

Working Groups are composed quite similarly in terms of roles, comparing group lists of participating people, in 2016 and 2019 (Annex 5). In 2016, on average, almost 60% of the participants in WGs had a role as policy maker and near 10% as funder. Experts make up the remaining 30%. This is quite comparable to 2019. The composition of the strategic Working Groups and the collaborative Working Groups appear to have become slightly more similar in 2019, compared to 2016. The average of Policy representatives and Funders in strategic Working Groups was 65.3% in 2016 and 63.5% in 2019. Still somewhat lower than the collaborative Working Groups average: 79.2% in 2016 and 72.1% in 2019.

5.4 Progress of country representation in SCAR

There is a large consistency in the qualitative data between 2016 and 2019 responses. It is still generally acknowledged that a 'fair' representation of countries in SCAR and its Working Groups is important. Again, consistent with 2016, there is a tendency to stress 'fair' representation in the Steering Group and the Plenary. These bodies have a decision making capacity and a good overview of the work of the individual Working Groups and are by many seen as the most logical place for

newcomers in SCAR to start. This is somewhat contradicted by other views that identify the Working Groups with their specific focus on a topic a more natural place to get more acquainted with SCAR.

When comparing **country representation** in Working Groups of SCAR between 2016 and 2019, differences remain. There is still underrepresentation of EU-13 and AC countries in SCAR. While existing systematic challenges for EU-13 (and AC countries) have not changed much, this may explain the continuing gap between EU-15 and EU-13 country representation. Having said that, there is a clear increase of country participation from EU-13 countries. This trend is confirmed by the qualitative data from the interviews, where similar remarks were made. In addition to an increase in participation from EU-13 countries, it was also pointed out that both active involvement and leadership of several EU-13 countries has increased. This is attributed mostly to the more experienced EU-13 countries. In addition, an increase to join mailing lists and incidental attendance of countries was noted. Such increased attention may indicate future steps towards increased participation. Country participation from AC countries remains roughly at the same, low level. When comparing country participation in terms of regions, differences between regions remains large. Especially between Northern and Western European regions compared with Eastern and Southern European ones. But also here, increase of country participation is visible for Eastern and Southern Europe. While this is obvious for Eastern Europe that only includes EU-13 countries, also Southern European countries seem to participate more. Country participation differs between individual Working Groups. Almost all groups have seen increasing or stabilising country participation numbers, with the exception of one group that has experienced a decrease in country participation.

With regard to **attendance**, in some Working Groups this number (people present at meetings) seems to slightly increase for EU-13 countries, but the available data is limited, and drawing general conclusions therefor difficult. Qualitative data is ambiguous. It was noted in the interviews that participation and contribution in some Working Groups increased. Other interviewees noted a decline of attention for the Working Groups and SCAR in general. This general decline of attention is explained as the result of 'competition with other networks and initiatives in the European Research Area'. Unambiguous was the generally shared notion that the workload could be better distributed amongst participants if more countries would become more active.

With respect to **organisational representation and participants roles**, there is a substantial increase visible in Plenary officials that are from a Ministry or closely affiliated organisation. This increase is fully explained by the EU-13 and AC countries' appointed Plenary officials. There is also an increase in officials from a Ministry or closely related affiliation that oversees Agriculture. With regard to roles of the Working Group participants, there are no big differences between data from 2016 and 2019.

6. INTERVIEW SYNTHESIS ON ARRANGEMENTS THAT IMPROVE INCLUSION

6.1 Participation, inclusion and enabling actors

Representation has received a lot of attention from the European Commission, with financial support directed towards specific programmes or schemes to improve transnational cooperation and inclusion of ‘widening’ countries, like the COST actions, the widening programme incorporated in H2020 and additional support like the 2018 *Mutual Learning Exercise on Widening Participation and Strengthening Synergies*. This attention is likely to remain, as newer Member States continue to press for opportunities to improve their ‘return on investments’ in the European Union. One of the ways to do so, is by active participation of EU-13 in European Research and Innovation policy design, through involvement in advisory bodies or professional partnerships. Interesting in this respect is that according to the EPRS study (2018), this does not specifically relate to influence over the H2020 Work Programmes, as ‘[...] *their representation related to the size of research and innovation systems is adequate*’ (EPRS, 2018). The success rate in the Framework Programmes is depending to a large extent on scientific excellence and the opportunity for newcomers to be able to link up with already existing networks. Generalising, especially EU-13 countries face the challenge of improving both their national Knowledge and Innovation Systems and the national policy structures enabling this KIS development. A second challenge is in linking up with the European R&I policy making process and linking national researchers with their European colleagues. A recent dynamic network analysis suggests research networks to open up somewhat more to EU-13 countries (EC, 2018a), but participation is still lagging behind. Being able to successfully participate in Comitology offers an opportunity to both advocate national priorities and connect with (research) networks and hence is important. Settings; or arrangements, that enable and actively stimulate participation, need to be open and accessible to functional and descriptive representatives, should enable participants to meaningfully engage and influence decisions and should minimise external and internal forms of exclusion.

Participation and inclusion can be seen as two sides of the same coin (‘representation’). They are *not* the same however. Operationalising the generally formulated conditions for inclusive arrangements in frame of SCAR and its Working Groups, will to some extent include ‘removing barriers’ for country participation. The main focus will be on the concrete role and actions that can be taken to create inclusive arrangements and in this way invite participation. SCAR as a body can take actions. But also the European Commission, in its role as SCAR Secretary can take specific actions. The countries can individually support measures to improve actions. Finally, the individual members (e.g. the *people* in SCAR) can play a role. At this point, it is worth noting that in line with the 2017 results, there is no change in perception perceived on representation and inclusion: it is still regarded as a critical challenge. What does seem to have changed, is the *weight* that is given to some of the underlying causes, though there is still total consensus on the way they are formulated in 2017. What also changed is the perception that the rather free ‘think-tank’ role of SCAR is increasingly put under pressure, in part, due to higher bureaucracy and less time for free exchange.

A commonly acknowledged, tangible hurdle to overcome, in order for countries to participate in SCAR is the limitations of resources; in time, money and human capacity. As extensively argued in the 2017 study, this a common issue, in spite of any country’s economic position. There will always be a need to justify resources being spent. However, such justification is easier if return on investment is clear. When the ERA-NET scheme was developed, it offered the opportunity to bring

in national research priorities and resulted in *tangible results* as in addition to developing common priorities it also included financial resources for new research. It positioned SCAR well and provided a mechanism for national policy makers to ensure valorisation of SCAR outcomes at the national level and provided them with justification for their spent resources. An approach fully in line with the MLE study recommendation for “*improving networking via participation in EU-level initiatives: devote resources to the development of strategic intelligence systems that can inform decision-making about participation in EU-level initiatives such as Public-Public-Partnerships (P2Ps), Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and other international networks. Use them to develop a strategic approach and prioritise those that can provide experience likely to enhance FP participation in future*” (MLE, 2018).

6.2 Arrangements that improve inclusion: some examples

Creating an enabling environment for countries to participate in a Committee such as SCAR, is also taking into account specific national preconditions, ones that are typically beyond the sphere of influence of SCAR or its Working Groups. Notwithstanding this, it is worthwhile to analyse the experiences of SCAR and the Working Groups in designing such environments.

Bring SCAR to the national level

It is often pointed out that visibility and awareness of (the work of) SCAR at the national level, to the right people is imperative. This implies mid- and high-level policy makers who are able to make (budget) decisions. Good opportunities in general to do so are high-level political events such as the **Presidency**. It was noted that Precedencies often indeed seem to be accompanied by a surge of national interest for the work of SCAR. In absence of such a good occasion, another way may be through organising **national SCAR meetings**. From 2017 to 2019, a total of six meetings were organised to increase visibility of SCAR and foster engagement in Spain, Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, Italy and the Baltic countries. The overall impression is that they serve their purpose well. These meetings are an opportunity to bring together national policy makers in different areas, and in several cases from different Ministries. They also provide a stage to explain the role of SCAR, its benefits and possible impacts at that national level. When organised well, with a clear focus and targeted at a specific audience, it can allow for thematical exchanges on relevant topics across national Ministries and knowledge institutes. Something that is not necessarily easy to create. One of the additional national benefits of such a meeting is the possibility to open up future national cooperation on relevant topics, facilitated by the personal connections that were being made during the meeting. In some countries, it facilitated connecting with sub-national level policy-makers as well. Such activities can be help to establish or strengthen national governance structures, one of the preconditions for strengthening of overall (R&I) system performance (MLE, 2018). In addition, national meetings are perceived as contributing to the emergence of individuals who become active in SCAR.

For Working Group participants, a national meeting offers an opportunity to showcase their work and results to peers and officials in the home country. While having national meetings is as such not the all-decisive trigger to free more national resources for SCAR work, it is generally seen as a way to stress the benefits of country representation at the European level and may in the longer

term indeed help to acquire national budgets. Getting the relevance of participating in SCAR across at the national level was described as the most important, difficult, lengthy and time-consuming process and seen as a key step towards becoming more involved in European policy-making and advocacy processes.

The national SCAR meetings organised from 2016 to 2019 were part of CASA's support activities to SCAR in the frame of improving country participation. It is noted that there has been discussion on the urgency of organising such meetings in countries that are already well-represented in SCAR. While not unreasonable, other views stress that benefits apply to *all* countries. In relation to this, the relevance of permanent structures for national input was pointed out, such as the French mirror groups. One of the challenges for organising a successful meeting, whether it is a CASA support meeting or a national mirror group meeting, is to identify and get the appropriate high-level decision-makers that have the actual capacity to allocate human resources and budget to actually join. In this light, the wish for SCAR Plenary meetings organised in less-represented countries was expressed.

Form follows content

By far the most prominent driver for country participation is seen in the **relevance and urgency of the themes** covered by SCAR and its Working Groups. The notion is that countries will (only) participate if the subject matters at the national level. Working Groups that have succeeded in doing so, include SWG AKIS, CWG AHW and BSW.

The **Strategic Working Group on Agricultural Knowledge and Innovation** has a long track record in creating inclusive arrangements. The group combines a number of elements that drive participation. National agricultural Knowledge and Innovation Systems, its development and the specific challenges of that development, is a *highly relevant topic for all countries* and the European Union. As pointed out in previous chapters, less-developed Knowledge and Innovation Systems is regarded as one of the major difficulties for EU-13 countries to participate well in the Framework Programmes. In addition, there is a high relevance as well-functioning KIS's are perceived to improve efficiency and effectiveness in agricultural practices. SWG AKIS has for a long time been active and successful in employing strategies to attract new Member States for the Working Group. Driven by a firm belief that if the group wanted to be able to voice any view 'on behalf of the European Member States and Associated Countries', it needed input from a good representation of those countries. Widening participation and asserting a proper gender balance in SWG AKIS has been explicitly targeted by its members, chairs and policy representatives from the EC. Actions were taken to improve matters, fully supported by the *Commissions' policy representative*, who *actively advocated membership of AKIS*, targeting new countries to join. The group *organised Working Group meetings in countries* where they wanted to attract new members, and *tirelessly advocated for basic support (like T&S reimbursement)* of its participants. The group tried to find alternative ways (through projects funding) to reimburse T&S of some new members, but had to conclude that after the project ended and funding was no longer available, the new members were once again unable to continue their presence in the group. What further works in favour of the group is that their results are not only 'taken into account' by the European Commission, but also credited as an AKIS contribution. While country participation is often a combination of different factors, an integral approach such as AKIS has, seems most effective. Important to remark is that the group

has been financially supported several times by SCAR Member States, thus allowing dedicated time for its work, a position not all groups share to an equal extent.

The **Collaborative Working Group on Animal Health and Welfare** is another example of how to build an inclusive arrangement, starting with a *highly relevant topic to all its members*. Since its start in 2005, this group has been quite stable in members and participation in meetings is high. Greatly facilitating this has been the participation in ERA-NETs. A common transnational call ensures a very *focussed incentive to participate* and some *resources becoming available* to do the work. An effect that the group experienced again recently, when drawing a new proposal spiked interest of a new group of members. In addition, CWG AHW propagates its focus beyond Europe as it contributes actively in *long-term international cooperation* and involvement in networks. CWG AHW also incorporates relevant stakeholders actively and in combining all these elements, the group has established itself as a *major linking pin between European initiatives on Animal Health and Welfare and international ones*. Like all groups, AHW welcomes new members to join and stimulates its current members to propose new candidates when deemed appropriate.

The need to develop **national policies or strategies** that link with European policies has had considerable impact on the attention for SCAR. This effect is in particular visible for bioeconomy. The European Bioeconomy Strategy called upon the Member States to develop their national Bioeconomy strategies. Not only did this development increased attention for the work of the relevant Working Groups of SCAR in recent years (in particular the Bioeconomy Strategic Working Group), it also provided a proper 'hook' for bringing relevant policy-makers together at the national level. Not surprisingly, most of the national meetings organised between 2016 and 2019 focussed on this topic.

The need to develop national bioeconomy strategies, in combination with the wish of Eastern European countries to get their national priorities more firmly acknowledged and addressed in European funding programmes, has also led to the BIOEAST initiative. This Central and Eastern European initiative for knowledge-based agriculture, aquaculture and forestry in the bioeconomy, was started in 2016 by the Visegrad Group countries: The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia and joined later by Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Slovenia. The BIOEAST initiative offers a shared strategic research and innovation framework for working towards sustainable bio-economies in the Central and Eastern European countries. Because of the macro-regions' economic, societal, geopolitical, cultural and historical homogeneity and complexity, cooperation is seen as a way to stimulate framework conditions favourable to bioeconomic growth and to address sustainability challenges successfully. An integral part of this cooperation is focussed at more vigorous EU-wide cooperation, especially with regard to filling in voids in the Framework Programmes and targeting Structural Funds. Especially since the research and innovation capacities of the macro-region are facing significant internal disparities in terms of effectively joining the European Research Area, joining forces is seen as important step towards the future. There are firm links between SCAR and the BIOEAST initiative through its members. Thus, the BIOEAST countries (can) bring their national priorities to SCAR in a coordinated way, and bring back relevant input to their national levels. As such, it has the potential to facilitate a two-way flow of information between SCAR, the Commission and Member States that are currently still underrepresented in SCAR; a substantial part of the BIOEAST members. This coordinated regional approach has the potential to accelerate regional development, as political weight has increased recently: The 2018

Joint Declaration from the Ministers of Agriculture (Bábolna Declaration, 2018), has recently been co-signed by 10 of the Research Ministers as well. This is a significant step towards inter-Ministerial cooperation and the development of well-functioning national policy systems and Knowledge and Innovation Systems.

These examples show elements that are important to take into account when creating inclusive environments. National policy development and increased regional cooperation efforts are inclusive arrangements, as such developments happen out of the sphere of influence of SCAR. They do however provide opportunities for SCAR, and in particular BSW, who has answered to these developments to create inclusive arrangement around, and thus benefit from increased participation. *That* is exactly what the bioeconomy examples show.

6.3 Inclusiveness in SCAR: strengths, challenges and suggestions for improvement

Is SCAR creating inclusive arrangements? Returning to the characteristics of inclusive arrangements, this paragraph attempts to assess this question. Starting with what inclusive arrangements need to address. Inclusive arrangements should be open and accessible to functional and descriptive representatives from potentially affected publics. Arrangements should enable participants to meaningfully engage and influence decisions. And in addition to the two above-mentioned characteristics, such arrangements should minimize external and internal forms of exclusion.

Open and accessible, meaningful engagement and influence

When taking into account the continuous attention of SCAR for participation and inclusion of its members, it can be considered quite **open and accessible to functional and descriptive representatives**. The Working Groups are very open to welcoming new members and have in many cases taken considerable efforts in trying to attract them. European Commission policy representatives that partake in Working Groups actively support efforts to attract more members. Participants are **enabled to meaningfully engage and influence decisions**. This open environment is one of the greatly valued characteristics of the Committee, although an increasing pressure on this openness has been noted the past years. The presence of the policy representatives from the European Commission in SCAR meetings and the ability to get into direct contact with them is noted as one of the important factors for Member States to attend meetings. The topics of the current Working Groups remain relevant on the national level and thus continue in most groups to attract new members and keep already active ones. However, more guidance from the Steering Group and Plenary on the expected results and impact is asked for as well. The notion that *form follows content*, however trivial it may seem, needs to be at the heart of any measure, action, idea and intention to increase country participation in SCAR. It also implies that the topics of the Working Groups need to stay relevant and in line with (or ahead of) the latest policy developments. An inclusive arrangement ensures that relevant national issues are being discussed, and in addition that publication of results is properly timed to be able to feed into the European and national policy process cycles. While it can be argued that SCAR and its Working Groups have been quite successful at identifying content that drives participation, the proper timing is not always easy to establish.

One of the current, major challenges perceived is to how SCAR will develop its position in the current P2P landscape and how to ensure a good position to continue addressing national priorities of its members at the European level. While SCAR has been the initiator of many of the current P2P initiatives, there is a certain elegance for SCAR to continue to act as focal point for coordination and, in addition, serve as tandem for the (national delegates in the) Programme Committee. It would allow SCAR to continue operating as the ‘relatively free agent’ in addition to the more formally assigned role of the national delegates in the Programme Committee. Such a coordinating and aligning role could also relieve the resources pressure felt at the national level (e.g. caused by more initiatives for international R&I coordination, competing for resources that have to be allocated at the national level). With Horizon Europe being currently fine-tuned, this coordinating role of SCAR would need attention. There appears to be a key organising role here for the European Commission. In its position as SCAR Secretary, it is well-positioned to facilitate deliberations on this topic and act as linking pin between SCAR, its Member States and the relevant units of RTD, AGRI and other DGs of the Commission. The European Commission, both through its policy officers in the Working Groups and in acting as SCAR Secretary, is regarded as having a pivotal position to advocate SCAR’s role, importance, uniqueness and benefits. SCAR could benefit from the Secretary underlining this, and doing so could invite Member States to invest (more) in SCAR. The SCAR Secretary also serves as linking pin between SCAR and the Programme Committee and would in similar ways be able to facilitate deliberations.

Ideas to improve inclusion include designing and implementing mechanisms that ensure the take up of SCAR outcomes at the national level and organising missions of SCAR delegates targeting the decision-makers in the national ministries. The national SCAR meetings have been acknowledged for contributing to these goals. It was furthermore suggested to focus stronger on what SCAR is about: the content. Develop more prospective studies or pilot studies that show State-of-Art, Public-Private collaborations and that generates advice to the European Commission and the SCAR Member States.

Minimize external and internal forms of exclusion

Inclusive environments should **minimize external and internal forms of exclusion**, which to a large extent lifts barriers for participation. While efforts have been made, this condition is difficult to meet and needs structural attention. Member States and Associated Countries in SCAR have their own responsibility to invest in European cooperation and to allocate people, time and money. They do so by appointing dedicated people to Working Groups, the Steering Group and Plenary. In several instances, member countries of SCAR financially supported, or still support chairs of Working Groups. The European Commission invests substantially through the inclusion of specific programmes in R&I actions. In the context of SCAR, additional resources for support were made available through a coordination and support action (CASA) that included a Work Package on representation and inclusion. An activity not yet mentioned in this report is the SCAR Mentoring Programme. This programme aimed to address the difficulties new participants experience in understanding SCAR. The programme supported newcomers by teaming them up with more experienced SCAR members. Experiences are quite positive and the programme appears to work quite sufficiently. Drawbacks of this approach are that it still takes additional time from people and that it is vulnerable because it relies heavily on willingness of more experienced members to act as mentor. However true that may be, if efforts to create an inclusive environment are taken seriously,

it means investing in human resources as well. Linking experienced and new members of the same country may constitute a more efficient approach.

Challenges will remain in assuring structural resources for creating inclusive environments. This refers not only to financial resources for T&S reimbursement, but also for structural support for the Working Groups, and support to continue with successful experiments. In this respect, it was noted that the support to SCAR received from the European the Commission, was highly appreciated and recognised as contributing to a more inclusive SCAR.

Ideas to improve inclusion include the establishment of an EC-funded 'widening SCAR' fellowship programme that enables targeted Member States to appoint additional human resources for concrete, dedicated tasks for SCAR, like mapping exercises. Such a programme could also include training new SCAR members. Such a suggestion constitutes an integrated approach, tackling multiple challenges at once. It was noted that activities with a limited time-frame and a clear end date are easier for countries to partake in. A final suggestion could be for the European Commission to organise 'side meetings' before or after a SCAR meeting for those countries who are new to the Committee, thus creating time to get better acquainted.

7. CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE SUPPORT APPROACHES

When assessing progress of participation and inclusion of countries in SCAR during the past four years, a modest, but steady increase of Member State participation is visible (AC participation remains fairly constant). Looking back over a longer period of time (from 2012 to 2019), this increase seems gradual and incremental. Time, efforts and attention of SCAR for inclusion and participation seems to have had some effect, although it is impossible to say anything about the strength of this correlation (e.g.: would countries have increased participation in SCAR without additional incentives?).

The *activities conducted* on this issue under the CASA support for SCAR (in addition to the numerous activities SCAR has employed through its Working Groups) were received well and may be improved and continued in the future. Improvements could include a more targeted approach to attract new participants. Such targeted approaches would constitute of tailored-made options that require good understanding of the local context and what may work in that context, all the more reason to explicitly involve targeted countries in designing and executing these targeted approaches.

The *analyses conducted* on this issue under the CASA support for SCAR were an effort to quantify 'strongly suspected ideas, drivers and barriers', make it tangible and measurable to an extent and to provide a base-line. Most of all, it served to bring together a diversity of opinions about how the composition of SCAR should look like, how to ensure continued interest of its members in SCAR, and how the future of SCAR could look like.

ANNEXES

Annex 1: countries in SCAR

COUNTRY CODE	FULL NAME	YEAR OF EU MEMBERSHIP	POLITICAL ASSOCIATION	R&I PERFORMANCE ¹	GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION ²
AL	Albania		Candidate country	Low	Southern Europe
AT	Austria	1995	EU-15	High	Western Europe
BE	Belgium	1958	EU-15	High	Western Europe
BG	Bulgaria	2007	EU-13	Low	Eastern Europe
CH	Switzerland		Associated	High	Western Europe
CY	Cyprus	2008	EU-13	Low	Non-European
CZ	Czech Republic	2004	EU-13	Low	Eastern Europe
DE	Germany	1958	EU-15	High	Western Europe
DK	Denmark	1973	EU-15	High	Northern Europe
EE	Estonia	2004	EU-13	Low	Northern Europe
EL	Greece	1981	EU-15	High	Southern Europe
ES	Spain	1986	EU-15	High	Southern Europe
FI	Finland	1995	EU-15	High	Northern Europe
FR	France	1958	EU-15	High	Western Europe
HR	Croatia	2013	EU-13	Low	Southern Europe
HU	Hungary	2004	EU-13	Low	Eastern Europe
IE	Ireland	1973	EU-15	High	Northern Europe
IL	Israel		Associated	High	Non-European
IS	Iceland		Associated	High	Northern Europe
IT	Italy	1958	EU-15	High	Southern Europe
LT	Lithuania	2004	EU-13	Low	Northern Europe
LU	Luxembourg	1958	EU-15	Low	Western Europe
LV	Latvia	2004	EU-13	Low	Northern Europe
ME	Montenegro		Candidate country	Low	Southern Europe
MK	Macedonia		Candidate country	Low	Southern Europe
MT	Malta	2004	EU-13	Low	Southern Europe
NL	The Netherlands	1958	EU-15	High	Western Europe
NO	Norway		Associated	High	Northern Europe
PL	Poland	2004	EU-13	Low	Eastern Europe
PT	Portugal	1986	EU-15	Low	Southern Europe
RO	Romania	2007	EU-13	Low	Eastern Europe
RS	Serbia		Candidate country	Low	Southern Europe
SE	Sweden	1995	EU-15	High	Northern Europe
SI	Slovenia	2004	EU-13	Low	Southern Europe
SK	Slovakia	2004	EU-13	Low	Eastern Europe
TR	Turkey		Candidate country	Low	Non-European
UK	The United Kingdom	1973	EU-15	High	Northern Europe

¹High and Low refers to the distinction made in the H2020 Spreading Excellence and Widening Participation WP, based on R&I performance indicator values of a country compared to the European average. As this is a relative to the average, we use HPC as higher performing countries and LPC as lower performing countries throughout this report.

²Based on United Nations Statistical Division data: <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/>

Annex 2: Interviewees

NAME		COUNTRY	AFFILIATION
Monique	Axelos	France	SWG Food Systems chair
Marina	Bagni	Italy	CWG AHW chair
Iva	Blažková	Czech Republic	Plenary delegate
Mike	Collins	U.K.	Plenary delegate
Cătălin	Dragomir	Romania	Plenary member
Jan	Van Esch	Netherlands	SWG Bioeconomy
Jesús	Escudero	Spain	SG member
Niels	Gotke	Denmark	Plenary Member
Adrien	Guichaoua	France	SWG AKIS chair
Siegfried	Harrer	Germany	SWG ARCH co-chair
Ioan	Jelev	Romania	Plenary delegate
Barna	Kovacs	Hungary	SG member
Ákos	Kristóf	Hungary	Plenary delegate
Rocío	Lansac	Spain	SG member
Michalis	Pavlidis	Greece	SWG FISH chair
Adam	Pavlina	Czech Republic	
Bernhard	Polten	Germany	CWG SAP chair
Elke	Saggau	Germany	SG member + Foresight Group + CWG SAP
Hermann	Schobesberger	Austria	CWG AHW co-chair
Kateřina	Stonawská	Czech Republic	
Dominique	Vandenkerckhove	Belgium	CWG AHW co-chair
Astrid	Willener	Austria	SG member

In addition, in the Bioeconomy Strategic Working Group meeting on July 8th 2019 in Helsinki, a moderated one-hour session was dedicated to representation and inclusion. The session covered questions as to what the group needs, how the BSW participants view country participation and what they see as challenges in improving country participation more in general. The BSW meeting was attended by more than twenty participants.

Annex 3: Interview Templates

Annex 3A: Template for Working Group chairs

In 2016 and 2017, a study regarding representation in SCAR was conducted, delivering on questions of representation, participation and involved institutions, as well as a brief look at the remit of SCAR. This study is continued in 2019 with an update, and with more attention on the “inclusion” part of representation: e.g. relating to what can be done to include countries (better) within the context of SCAR. These questions form the basis for a semi-structured interview with the (co- / vice-)chairs of the Working Groups.

I. Participation

WG 1A: Should a Working Group (WG) actively try to get more countries participating? Why (not)?

WG 1B: Do you see (active) participation of Member States (MS) as an issue?

II. Inclusion

WG 2A: Does your WG try to increase MS participation? If yes, how?

WG 2B: What have been your experiences with the used methods?

WG 2C: Did participation of MS change in the past 3-5 years?
(Did more or less MS join or become more active?)

WG 2D: Did active participation (people being at meetings, giving more input) increase in the past 3-5 years?

WG 2E: Has your / the WGs idea's on participation and inclusion of MS changed the past 3-5 years? If yes, how?

WG 2F: Does the SG stimulate you to include more countries? If yes, how?

WG 2G: Does the EC stimulate you to include more countries? If yes, how?

The 2017 study on representation indicated three major ‘clusters’ with explanations for the lower participation of EU-13, AC and Eastern and Southern European countries: *I Resources restraints* - In terms of human resources, time and money; *II Familiarity with the EU, national priorities and internal organisation* - Unfamiliarity with ‘how the EU works’, what investments need to be made, what benefits are in terms of return on investment, what is needed in terms of national coordination. Obviously, national priorities also determine whether countries partake in a WG or not; and *III Familiarity with SCAR and expectation management* - It takes time to learn how SCAR works and what is done there. It may not always be clear to new participants how SCAR is organised. Its position and influence may be unclear to MS / AC.

WG 3A: Did the results of the 2017 study on representation (see text above) surprise you?

WG 3B: What do you think is the most likely explanation why some countries participate less in SCAR?

WG 3C: What do you think is most effective in increasing active participation in the WG? **Please rank - 1 being ‘most effective’:**

- Improving communication about SCAR through website, folders, meetings and such
- Organising informative meetings like the SCAR national meetings
- Offering financial T&S compensation by EC
- Offering financial T&S compensation by MS itself
- EC should make money available for WGs to hold rotating meetings in different EU MS
- Each participating MS should host a WG meeting at least once every three years
- A mentoring programme to get newcomers quickly involved
- I have a better / another idea: ...

In the past three years, a number of **national SCAR meetings** were organised in frame of the CASA support, with the aim to increase knowledge about SCAR at the national level, offer a setting for exchange between national policy makers and scientists, and stimulate participation in SCAR.

WG 4A: Have you been present at or organising one or more of the national meetings that were held?

WG 4B: Do you think such meetings will stimulate MS to increase SCAR participation?

WG 4C: Do you think such meetings will stimulate MS to reimburse T&S for SG members? And WG participants?

WG 4D: Would you support more national SCAR meetings in the upcoming years?

WG 4E: Who should pay the expenses?

The mentoring Programme was designed to connect new SCAR participants with experienced colleagues. Its aim was to stimulate interaction, learning on the workings of SCAR (and EC) and accelerate getting to know SCAR.

WG 5A: Are you, or have you been a mentor or mentee?

WG 5B: What are your ideas on the mentoring programme?

WG 5C: Will a mentoring programme stimulate MS to increase SCAR participation?

WG 5D: Will a mentoring programme stimulate MS to reimburse T&S for SG members? And WG participants?

WG 5E: Would you support continuation of a mentoring programme after 2019?

WG 5F: Who should pay the expenses?

Annex 3B: Template for Steering Group members

In 2016 and 2017, a study regarding representation in SCAR was conducted, delivering on questions of representation, participation and involved institutions, as well as a brief look at the remit of SCAR. This study is continued in 2019 with an update, and with more attention on the “inclusion” part of representation: e.g. relating to what can be done to include countries (better) within the context of SCAR. These questions form the basis for a semi-structured interview with SCAR Steering Group members.

II. Participation

- SG 1A:** Should the SG actively try to get more countries participating in the SG? Why (not)?
SG 1B: Should the SG actively try to get more countries participating in the Working Groups (WG)? Why (not)?
SG 1C: Do you see (active) participation of Member States (MS) in the SG as an issue?

II. Inclusion

- SG 2A:** Does the SG try to increase MS participation? If yes, how?
SG 2B: What have been your experiences with the used methods?
SG 2C: Did participation of MS change in the past 3-5 years? (Did more or less MS join or become more active?)
SG 2D: Did active participation (people being at meetings, giving more input) increase in the past 3-5 years?
SG 2E: Have your ideas on participation and inclusion of MS changed in the past 3-5 years? If yes, in what way?
SG 2F: Does the EC stimulate you to include more countries? In what way?

The 2017 study on representation indicated three major ‘clusters’ with explanations for the lower participation of EU-13, AC and Eastern and Southern European countries: *I Resources restraints* – In terms of human resources, time and money; *II Familiarity with the EU, national priorities and internal organisation* – Unfamiliarity with ‘how the EU works’, what investments need to be made, what benefits are in terms of return on investment, what is needed in terms of national coordination. Obviously, national priorities also determine whether countries partake in a WG or not; and *III Familiarity with SCAR and expectation management* – It takes time to learn how SCAR works and what is done there. It may not always be clear to new participants how SCAR is organised. Its position and influence may be unclear to MS / AC.

- SG 3A:** Did the results of the 2017 study on representation (see text above) surprise you?
SG 3B: What do you think is the most likely explanation why some countries participate less in SCAR?
SG 3C: What do you think is most effective in increasing active participation in the SG? **Please rank – 1 being ‘most effective’:**
- Improving communication about SCAR through website, folders, meetings and such
 - Organising informative meetings like the SCAR national meetings
 - Offering financial T&S compensation by EC
 - A mentoring programme to get newcomers quickly involved
 - I have a better / another idea: ...

In the past three years, a number of **national SCAR meetings** were organised in frame of the CASA support, with the aim to increase knowledge about SCAR at the national level, offer a setting for exchange between national policy makers and scientists, and stimulate participation in SCAR.

- SG 4A:** Have you been present at or organising one or more of the national meetings that were held?
SG 4B: Do you think such meetings will stimulate MS to increase SCAR participation?

- SG 4C:** Do you think such meetings will stimulate MS to reimburse T&S for SG members? And WG participants?
- SG 4D:** Would you support more national SCAR meetings in the upcoming years?
- SG 4E:** Who should pay the expenses?

The mentoring Programme was designed to connect new SCAR participants with experienced colleagues. Its aim was to stimulate interaction, learning on the workings of SCAR (and EC) and accelerate getting to know SCAR.

- SG 5A:** Are you, or have you been a mentor or mentee?
- SG 5B:** What are your ideas on the mentoring programme?
- SG 5C:** Will a mentoring programme stimulate MS to increase SCAR participation?
- SG 5D:** Will a mentoring programme stimulate MS to reimburse T&S for SG members? And WG participants?
- SG 5E:** Would you support continuation of a mentoring programme after 2019?
- SG 5F:** Who should pay the expenses?

Annex 3C: Template for Plenary members

In 2016 and 2017, a study regarding representation in SCAR was conducted, delivering on questions of representation, participation and involved institutions, as well as a brief look at the remit of SCAR. This study is continued in 2019 with an update, and with more attention on the “inclusion” part of representation: e.g. relating to what can be done to include countries (better) within the context of SCAR. These questions form the basis for a semi-structured interview with SCAR Plenary members.

I. Participation

PL 1A: Should SCAR actively try to get more countries participating in its meetings? Why (not)?

PL 1B: Do you see (active) participation of Member States (MS) in SCAR as an issue?

II. Inclusion

PL 2A: Does SCAR try to increase MS participation? If yes, how?

PL 2B: Did participation of MS change in the past 3-5 years? (Did more or less MS join or become more active?)

PL 2C: Did active participation (people being at meetings, giving more input) increase in the past 3-5 years?

PL 2D: Have your ideas on participation and inclusion of MS changed in the past 3-5 years? If yes, in what way?

PL 2E: Does the EC stimulate SCAR to include more countries? In what way?

The 2017 study on representation indicated three major ‘clusters’ with explanations for the lower participation of EU-13, AC and Eastern and Southern European countries: *I Resources restraints* - In terms of human resources, time and money; *II Familiarity with the EU, national priorities and internal organisation* - Unfamiliarity with ‘how the EU works’, what investments need to be made, what benefits are in terms of return on investment, what is needed in terms of national coordination. Obviously, national priorities also determine whether countries partake in a WG or not; and *III Familiarity with SCAR and expectation management* - It takes time to learn how SCAR works and what is done there. It may not always be clear to new participants how SCAR is organised. Its position and influence may be unclear to MS / AC.

PL 3A: Did the results of the 2017 study on representation (see text above) surprise you?

PL 3B: What do you think is the most likely explanation why some countries participate less in SCAR?

PL 3C: What do you think is most effective in increasing active participation in the SG? **Please rank - 1 being ‘most effective’:**

- Improving communication about SCAR through website, folders, meetings and such
- Organising informative meetings like the SCAR national meetings
- Offering financial T&S compensation by EC
- A mentoring programme to get newcomers quickly involved
- I have a better / another idea: ...

SUBSET MS NATIONAL MEETINGS

In the past three years, a number of **national SCAR meetings** were organised in frame of the CASA support, with the aim to increase knowledge about SCAR at the national level, offer a setting for exchange between national policy makers and scientists, and stimulate participation in SCAR.

SG 4A: What has been your experience with organising a national SCAR meeting?

SG 4B: Did it help to stimulate your country to increase SCAR participation? How?

SG 4C: Did it help in securing some funding to reimburse T&S for SG members? And WG participants?

SG 4D: Would you recommend organising a national meeting to your SCAR colleagues in other countries?

Annex 4: Subset distributions of country representation in SCAR Steering Group




Figure 4a: Number and proportion of countries in SCAR according to their political association. EU-15 (15 of 15), EU-13 (13 of 13), AC (9 of 16).




Figure 4b: Number and proportion of countries in the Steering Group in 2016 according to their political association.




Figure 4c: Number and proportion of countries in the Steering Group in 2019 according to their political association.




Figure 5a: Number and proportion of Lower Performing and Higher Performing Countries in SCAR.




Figure 5b: Number and proportion of Lower Performing and Higher Performing Countries in the Steering Group in 2016.




Figure 5c: Number and proportion of Lower Performing and Higher Performing Countries in the Steering Group in 2019.




Figure 6a: Number and proportion of countries in SCAR according to their geographical distribution.




Figure 6b: Number and proportion of countries in the Steering Group in 2016 according to their geographical distribution.




Figure 6c: Number and proportion of countries in the Steering Group in 2019 according to their geographical distribution.

Annex 5: Category distribution of participants in Working Groups⁶

Table 5a: participants and their roles in WGs⁷ in 2016. Data excludes EC observers and stakeholders, the latter unless explicitly included as group members. P= policy maker, F= funder, E= expert, S= stakeholder.

In numbers	P	F	E	S
AKIS	24		24	
FISH	24	1	10	1
BIOECONOMY	21	2	12	
ARCH	16	2	15	
FORESTRY	10	3	3	
FOOD SYSTEMS	28	3	18	
AHW	38	5	6	
SAP	35	13	19	1

Table 5c: participants roles in WGs¹¹ in % in 2016. Data excludes EC observers and stakeholders, the latter unless explicitly included as group members. P= policy maker, F= funder, E= expert, S= stakeholder.

In %	P	F	E	S
AKIS	50%		50%	
FISH	66%	3%	28%	3%
BIOECONOMY	60%	6%	34%	
ARCH	49%	6%	45%	
FORESTRY	62%	19%	19%	
FOOD SYSTEMS	57%	6%	37%	
AHW	78%	10%	12%	
SAP	51%	19%	28%	2%

Table 5b: Participants and their roles in WGs¹¹ in 2016. Data includes EC observers and stakeholder observers (each observer organisation, not person, is counted as 1). P= policy maker, F= funder, E= expert, S= stakeholder.

In numbers	P	F	E	S
AKIS	26		28	7
FISH	27	1	10	6
BIOECONOMY	24	2	13	
ARCH	19	2	15	2
FORESTRY	11	3	3	1
FOOD SYSTEMS	30	3	18	3
AHW	40	5	6	3
SAP	37	13	19	4

Table 5d: roles in WGs¹¹ in % in 2016. Data includes EC observers and stakeholder observers. (each organisation, not person, is counted as 1). P= policy maker, F= funder, E= expert, S= stakeholder.

In %	P	F	E	S
AKIS	43%		46%	11%
FISH	61%	2%	23%	14%
BIOECONOMY	62%	5%	33%	
ARCH	50%	5%	40%	5%
FORESTRY	61%	17%	17%	5%
FOOD SYSTEMS	56%	6%	33%	5%
AHW	74%	9%	11%	6%
SAP	51%	18%	26%	5%

⁶ When assessing the roles of participants in Working Groups, one of the methodological difficulties that was encountered, was the often-times combination of roles: many policy or stakeholder or funder participants are also experts in their respective fields. What was the dominant role was not always entirely clear. It was decided to follow this line of reasoning: Participants with a combination PF or PE are added to the 'P' group as one can be a policymaker and expert, but an expert per definition – e.g. working in a research institute – is not a policy maker or a research funder. With the same reasoning, FE is included in the 'F' group. Many groups discern between 'participants' and 'observers', the latter usually applying to EC participants and stakeholder organisations. Only when explicitly stated as member of the group, stakeholder representatives are included.

⁷ All participants are counted per head, with the exception of observers(O): these are counted per represented organisation. It is not uncommon that more than one person from the same organisation participates in a Working Group. Observers are either EC participants or stakeholders, representing a specific interest. EC participants are counted per DG represented.

Table 6a: participants and their roles in WGs in 2019. Data excludes EC observers and stakeholders, the latter unless explicitly included as group members. P= policy maker, F= funder, E= expert, S= stakeholder.

In numbers	P	F	E	S
AKIS	41		32	
FISH	28	1	11	1
BIOECONOMY	45	2	20	
ARCH	12	2	15	
FORESTRY	18	3	9	
FOOD SYSTEMS	36	6	22	
AHW	42	8	18	
SAP	35	13	19	1

Table 6c: participants roles in WGs in % in 2019. Data excludes EC observers and stakeholders, the latter unless explicitly included as group members. P= policy maker, F= funder, E= expert, S= stakeholder.

In %	P	F	E	S
AKIS	56%		44%	
FISH	68%	2%	27%	2%
BIOECONOMY	67%	3%	30%	
ARCH	41%	7%	52%	
FORESTRY	60%	10%	30%	
FOOD SYSTEMS	56%	9%	34%	
AHW	62%	12%	26%	
SAP	51%	19%	28%	2%

Table 6b: Participants and their roles in WGs in 2019. Data includes EC observers and stakeholder observers (each observer organisation, not person, is counted as 1). P= policy maker, F= funder, E= expert, S= stakeholder.

In numbers	P	F	E	S
AKIS	43		32	9
FISH	30	1	11	8
BIOECONOMY	50	2	23	
ARCH	15	2	15	2
FORESTRY	19	3	9	2
FOOD SYSTEMS	38	6	22	4
AHW	44	8	18	3
SAP	37	13	19	4

Table 6d: roles in WGs in % in 2019. Data includes EC observers and stakeholder observers. (each organisation, not person, is counted as 1). P= policy maker, F= funder, E= expert, S= stakeholder.

In %	P	F	E	S
AKIS	51%		38%	11%
FISH	60%	2%	22%	16%
BIOECONOMY	67%	3%	31%	
ARCH	44%	6%	44%	6%
FORESTRY	58%	9%	27%	6%
FOOD SYSTEMS	54%	9%	31%	6%
AHW	60%	11%	25%	4%
SAP	51%	18%	26%	5%

Annex 6: Key figures per Working Group

Annex 6A: Collaborative Working Group AHW

I. COUNTRY INVOLVEMENT

Table 1: Countries participating in the Working Group across political association. SCAR distribution is added for reference. NS = non-SCAR.

	SCAR		2016		2017		2018	
EU-15	15	41%	13	65%	13	65%	13	62%
EU-13	13	35%	2	10%	2	10%	4	18%
AC	9	24%	4	20%	4	20%	4	18%
NS			1	5%	1	5%	1	5%
	37		20		20		21	




Figure 1a: Division of SCAR countries (in %)




Figure 1b: Division of SCAR countries in AHW in 2016 (in %). NS = non-SCAR




Figure 1c: Division of SCAR countries in AHW in 2017 (in %). NS = non-SCAR




Figure 1d: Division of SCAR countries in AHW in 2018 (in %). NS = non-SCAR




Figure 2a: Division of SCAR countries (in %)




Figure 2b: Division of SCAR countries and RU in AHW per region in 2016.




Figure 2c: Division of SCAR countries and RU in AHW per region in 2017.




Figure 2d: Division of SCAR countries and RU in AHW per region in 2018.

II. COUNTRY COVERAGE AT MEETINGS (ATTENDANCE)

Table 2: Attendance of participants (country) at WG meetings in % along political association. Count is per country.

Political association			
	2016	2017	2018
EU-15	77%	81%	81%
EU-13	50%	25%	25%
AC	38%	50%	63%
NON-SCAR	100%	0%	0%

Table 2b: Attendance of participants (country) at WG meetings in % along geographical distribution. Count is per country.

Geographical distribution			
	2016	2017	2018
Western Europe	83%	83%	92%
Northern Europe	57%	50%	50%
Eastern Europe	50%	0%	25%
Southern Europe	83%	100%	100%
Non-European	50%	50%	25%

III. ROLES IN THE WORKING GROUP

'Roles' refers to the main role a person has in the group. People can have a combination of different roles. P=Policy representative, E=Expert, S=Stakeholder representative, F=Funder, or a combination of two roles. Combinations are aggregated to either P, F, E or S.




Figure 3a: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2016.




Figure 3b: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2017.




Figure 3c: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2018.




Figure 4a: Roles of the country participants and the observers in the WG in 2016.




Figure 4b: Roles of the country participants and the observers in the WG in 2017.




Figure 4c: Roles of the country participants and the observers in the WG in 2018.

Annex 6B: Collaborative Working Group SAP

I. COUNTRY INVOLVEMENT

Table 1: Countries participating in the Working Group in 2016 across political association. SCAR distribution is added for reference. nd = no data available.

	SCAR		2016		2017		2018		2019	
EU-15	15	41%	15	63%	nd	nd	15	63%	nd	nd
EU-13	13	35%	7	29%	nd	nd	7	29%	nd	nd
AC	9	24%	2	8%	nd	nd	2	8%	nd	nd
	37		24				24			




Figure 1a: Division of SCAR countries (in %)




Figure 1b: Division of SCAR countries in SAP in 2016 (in %).




Figure 1c: Division of SCAR countries in SAP in 2018 (in %).




Figure 2a: participation in SCAR per region.




Figure 2b: Division of SCAR countries in SAP per region in 2016.




Figure 2c: Division of SCAR countries in SAP per region in 2018.

II. COUNTRY COVERAGE AT MEETINGS (ATTENDANCE)

No data available.

III. ROLES IN THE WORKING GROUP

'Roles' refers to the main role a person has in the group. People can have a combination of different roles. P=Policy representative, E=Expert, S=Stakeholder representative, F=Funder, or a combination of two roles. Combinations are aggregated to either P, F, E or S.




Figure 3a: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2016.




Figure 3b: Roles of the country participants and the observers in the WG in 2018.

Annex 6C: Strategic Working Group AKIS

I. COUNTRY INVOLVEMENT

Table 1: Countries participating in the Working Group per year across political association. SCAR distribution is added for reference.

	SCAR		2014/15		2016		2017		2018/19	
EU-15	15	41%	14	78%	13	62%	13	57%	14	56%
EU-13	13	35%	2	11%	7	33%	8	35%	9	36%
AC	9	24%	2	11%	1	5%	2	9%	2	8%
	37		18		21		23		25	




Figure 1a: Division of SCAR countries (in %)




Figure 1b: Division of SCAR countries in AKIS in 2014-2015 (in %)




Figure 1c: Division of SCAR countries in AKIS in 2016 (in %)




Figure 1d: Division of SCAR countries in AKIS in 2017 (in %)




Figure 1e: Division of SCAR countries in AKIS in 2018/19 (in %)




Figure 2a: participation in SCAR per region.




Figure 2b: Participation of SCAR countries in AKIS per region in 2014-2015.




Figure 2c: Participation of SCAR countries in AKIS per region in AKIS in 2016.




Figure 2d: Participation of SCAR countries in AKIS per region in AKIS in 2017.




Figure 2e: Participation of SCAR countries in AKIS per region in AKIS in 2018/19.

II. COUNTRY COVERAGE AT MEETINGS (ATTENDANCE)

Table 2: Attendance of participants (country) at WG meetings in %. Count is per country. Only data for 2016 available.

Political association	Geographical distribution	
EU-15	67%	Western Europe 92%
EU-13	43%	Northern Europe 42%
AC	0%	Eastern Europe 42%
		Southern Europe 75%
		Non-European 0%

III. ROLES IN THE WORKING GROUP

'Roles' refers to the main role a person has in the group. People can have a combination of different roles. P=Policy representative, E=Expert, S=Stakeholder representative, F=Funder, or a combination of two roles. Combinations are aggregated to either P, F, E or S.




Figure 3a: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2014/15.




Figure 3b: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2016.




Figure 3c: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2017.




Figure 3d: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2018/19.




Figure 3e: Roles of the country participants and the observers in the WG in 2014-2015




Figure 3f: Roles of the country participants and the observers in the WG in 2016.




Figure 3g: Roles of the country participants and the observers in the WG in 2017.




Figure 3h: Roles of the country participants and the observers in the WG in 2018/19.

IV. TRENDS




Figure 4a: Development of country participation along political association from 2014/15 to 2018/19.




Figure 4b: Development of role participation of country participants and observers from 2014/15 to 2018/19.

Annex 6D: Strategic Working Group FISH

I. COUNTRY INVOLVEMENT

Table 1: Countries participating in the Working Group per year across political association. SCAR distribution is added for reference. NS = non-SCAR

	SCAR		2014		2015		2016		2017		2018		2019	
EU-15	15	41%	12	57%	10	59%	10	59%	12	60%	12	60%	12	60%
EU-13	13	35%	4	19%	4	24%	4	24%	5	25%	5	25%	5	25%
AC	9	24%	4	19%	3	18%	3	18%	3	15%	3	15%	3	15%
NS			1	5%										
	37		21		17		17		20		20		20	




Figure 1a: Division of SCAR countries (in %)




Figure 1b: Division of SCAR countries in FISH in 2014 (in %)




Figure 1c: Division of SCAR countries in FISH in 2015 (in %)




Figure 1d: Division of SCAR countries in FISH in 2016 (in %)




Figure 1e: Division of SCAR countries in FISH in 2017 (in %)




Figure 1f: Division of SCAR countries in FISH in 2018 (in %)




Figure 1g: Division of SCAR countries in FISH in 2019 (in %)




Figure 2a: participation in SCAR per region.




Figure 2b: Participation of SCAR countries in FISH per region in 2014.




Figure 2c: Participation of SCAR countries in FISH per region in 2015.




Figure 2d: Participation of SCAR countries in FISH per region in 2016.




Figure 2e: Participation of SCAR countries in FISH per region in 2017.




Figure 2f: Participation of SCAR countries in FISH per region in 2018.




Figure 2g: Participation of SCAR countries in FISH per region in 2019.

II. COUNTRY COVERAGE AT MEETINGS (ATTENDANCE)

Table 2a: Attendance of participants (country) at WG meetings in % along political association. Count is per country. NS =non-SCAR country, na =not applicable.

Political association						
	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
EU-15	67%	80%	70%	56%	56%	67%
EU-13	50%	33%	75%	40%	40%	40%
AC	25%	67%	44%	33%	25%	0%
NS	0%	na	na	na	na	na

Table 2b: Attendance of participants (country) at WG meetings in % along geographical distribution. Count is per country.

Geographical distribution						
	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Western Europe	63%	100%	100%	75%	63%	75%
Northern Europe	56%	71%	62%	39%	54%	43%
Eastern Europe	75%	22%	67%	31%	25%	25%
Southern Europe	50%	56%	67%	83%	42%	67%
Non-European	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%

III. ROLES IN THE WORKING GROUP

'Roles' refers to the main role a person has in the group. People can have a combination of different roles. P=Policy representative, E=Expert, S=Stakeholder representative, F=Funder, or a combination of two roles. Combinations are aggregated to either P, F, E or S.




Figure 3a: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2014.




Figure 3b: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2015.




Figure 3c: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2016.




Figure 3d: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2017.




Figure 3e: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2018.




Figure 3f: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2019.




Figure 4a: Roles of the country participant and the observers in the WG in 2014.




Figure 4b: Roles of the country participant and the observers in the WG in 2015.




Figure 4c: Roles of the country participant and the observers in the WG in 2016.




Figure 4d: Roles of the country participant and the observers in the WG in 2017.




Figure 4e: Roles of the country participant and the observers in the WG in 2018.




Figure 4f: Roles of the country participant and the observers in the WG in 2019.

IV. TRENDS




Figure 4a: Development of country participation along political association from 2014 to 2019. NS = Non-SCAR country.




Figure 4b: Development of role participation of country participants and observers from 2014 to 2019.

Annex 6E: Strategic Working Group Bioeconomy

I. COUNTRY INVOLVEMENT

Table 1: Countries participating in the Working Group per year across political association. SCAR distribution is added for reference.

	SCAR		2012		2013		2014		2015		2016		2017		2018		2019	
EU-15	15	41%	11	79%	11	73%	11	73%	11	73%	12	63%	13	65%	13	62%	13	62%
EU-13	13	35%	1	7%	2	13%	2	13%	2	13%	5	26%	5	25%	6	29%	6	29%
AC	9	24%	2	14%	2	13%	2	13%	2	13%	2	11%	2	10%	2	10%	2	10%
	37		14		15		15		15		19		20		21		21	




Figure 1a: Division of SCAR countries (in %)




Figure 1b: Division of SCAR countries in BSW in 2012 (in %)




Figure 1c: Division of SCAR countries in BSW in 2013 (in %)




Figure 1d: Division of SCAR countries in BSW in 2014 (in %)




Figure 1e: Division of SCAR countries in BSW in 2015 (in %)




Figure 1f: Division of SCAR countries in BSW in 2016 (in %)




Figure 1g: Division of SCAR countries in BSW in 2017 (in %)




Figure 1h: Division of SCAR countries in BSW in 2018 (in %)




Figure 1i: Division of SCAR countries in BSW in 2019 (in %)




Figure 2a: participation in SCAR per region.




Figure 2b: Participation of SCAR countries in BSW per region in 2012.




Figure 2c: Division of SCAR countries in BSW per region in 2013.




Figure 2d: Division of SCAR countries in BSW per region in 2014.




Figure 2e: Division of SCAR countries in BSW per region in 2015.




Figure 2f: Division of SCAR countries in BSW per region in 2016.




Figure 2g: Division of SCAR countries in BSW per region in 2017.




Figure 2h: Division of SCAR countries in BSW per region in 2018.




Figure 2i: Division of SCAR countries in BSW per region in 2019.

II. COUNTRY COVERAGE AT MEETINGS (ATTENDANCE)

Table 2a: Attendance of participants (country) at WG meetings in % along political association. Count is per country. 2016 and 2019 only one data point.

Political association	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
EU-15	82%	70%	70%	73%	58%	69%	58%	67%
EU-13	100%	33%	17%	0%	0%	47%	33%	83%
AC	75%	17%	50%	50%	0%	100%	83%	100%

Table 2b: Attendance of participants (country) at WG meetings in % along geographical distribution. Count is per country. 2016 and 2019 only one data point.

Geographical distribution								
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Western Europe	100%	75%	100%	88%	75%	73%	80%	60%
Northern Europe	60%	44%	33%	42%	29%	75%	50%	75%
Eastern Europe	100%	33%	0%	0%	0%	22%	33%	75%
Southern Europe	75%	83%	67%	75%	50%	44%	44%	67%
Non-European	100%	33%	100%	50%	0%	100%	67%	100%

III. ROLES IN THE WORKING GROUP

'Roles' refers to the main role a person has in the group. People can have a combination of different roles. P=Policy representative, E=Expert, S=Stakeholder representative, F=Funder, or a combination of two roles. Combinations are aggregated to either P, F, E or S.




Figure 3a: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2012.




Figure 3b: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2013.




Figure 3c: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2014.




Figure 3d: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2015.




Figure 3e: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2016.




Figure 3f: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2017.




Figure 3g: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2018.




Figure 3h: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2019.

IV. TRENDS




Figure 4a: Development of country participation along political association from 2012 to 2019. For 2016 and 2019, there is only one data point available.




Figure 4b: Development of role participation of country participants and observers from 2012 to 2019.

Annex 6F: Strategic Working Group ARCH

I. COUNTRY INVOLVEMENT

Table 1: Countries participating in the Working Group per year across political association. SCAR distribution is added for reference.

	SCAR		2013		2014		2015		2016		2017		2018		2019	
EU-15	15	41%	10	84%	10	76%	9	69%	9	69%	9	69%	8	100%	8	100%
EU-13	13	35%	1	8%	1	8%	2	16%	2	16%	2	16%	0		0	
AC	9	24%	1	8%	2	16%	2	15%	2	15%	2	15%	0		0	
	37		12		13		13		13		13		8		8	




Figure 1a: Division of SCAR countries (in %)




Figure 1b: Division of SCAR countries in ARCH in 2013 (in %)




Figure 1c: Division of SCAR countries in ARCH in 2014 (in %)




Figure 1d: Division of SCAR countries in ARCH in 2015 (in %). Data for 2016 and 2017 is same as 2015.




Figure 1e: Division of SCAR countries in ARCH in 2018 (in %). Data for 2019 is same as 2018.




Figure 2a: participation in SCAR per region.




Figure 2b: Participation of SCAR countries in ARCH per region in 2013.




Figure 2c: Division of SCAR countries in ARCH per region in 2014.




Figure 2d: Division of SCAR countries in ARCH per region in 2015. Data for 2016 and 2017 is same as 2015.




Figure 2e: Division of SCAR countries in ARCH per region in 2018. Data for 2019 is same as 2018.

II. COUNTRY COVERAGE AT MEETINGS (ATTENDANCE)

Table 2a: Attendance of participants (country) at WG meetings in % along political association. Count is per country. No attendance data available for 2016-2019.

Political association			
	2013	2014	2015
EU-15	90%	50%	39%
EU-13	50%	0%	0%
AC	50%	25%	25%

Table 2b: Attendance of participants (country) at WG meetings in % along geographical distribution. Count is per country. Na =not applicable. No attendance data available for 2016-2019.

Geographical distribution			
	2013	2014	2015
Western Europe	100%	63%	75%
Northern Europe	75%	25%	0%
Eastern Europe	na	na	0%
Southern Europe	75%	38%	13%
Non-European	50%	0%	0%

III. ROLES IN THE WORKING GROUP

‘Roles’ refers to the main role a person has in the group. People can have a combination of different roles. P=Policy representative, E=Expert, S=Stakeholder representative, F=Funder, or a combination of two roles. Combinations are aggregated to either P, F, E or S.




Figure 3a: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2013.




Figure 3b: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2014.




Figure 3c: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2015.




Figure 3d: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2016 and 2017.

IV. TRENDS




Figure 4a: Development of country participation along political association from 2013 to 2017.




Figure 4b: Development of role participation of country participants and observers from 2013 to 2017.

III. ROLES IN THE WORKING GROUP

'Roles' refers to the main role a person has in the group. People can have a combination of different roles. P=Policy representative, E=Expert, S=Stakeholder representative, F=Funder, or a combination of two roles. Combinations are aggregated to either P, F, E or S.




Figure 3a: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2016.




Figure 3b: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2017.




Figure 3c: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2019.




Figure 4a: Roles of the country participants and the observers in the WG in 2016




Figure 4b: Roles of the country participants and the observers in the WG in 2017.




Figure 4c: Roles of the country participants and the observers in the WG in 2019.

Annex 6H: Strategic Working Group Food Systems

I. COUNTRY INVOLVEMENT

Table 1: Countries participating in the Working Group per year across political association. SCAR distribution is added for reference.

	SCAR		2016		2017		2018		2019	
EU-15	15	41%	13	65%	13	65%	13	59%	13	62%
EU-13	13	35%	4	20%	4	20%	6	27%	5	24%
AC	9	24%	3	15%	3	15%	3	14%	3	14%
	37		20		20		22		21	




Figure 1a: Division of SCAR countries (in %)




Figure 1b: Division of SCAR countries in FOOD in 2016 and 2017 (in %)




Figure 1c: Division of SCAR countries in FOOD in 2018 (in %)




Figure 1d: Division of SCAR countries in FOOD in 2019 (in %)




Figure 2a: participation in SCAR per region.




Figure 2b: Division of SCAR countries in FOOD per region in 2016 and 2017 (in %)




Figure 2c: Division of SCAR countries in FOOD per region in 2018 (in %)




Figure 2d: Division of SCAR countries in FOOD per region in 2019 (in %)

II. COUNTRY COVERAGE AT MEETINGS (ATTENDANCE)

Table 2a: Attendance of participants (country) at WG meetings in % along political association. Count is per country. Only one data point for 2016 and 2019 available.

Political association	2016	2017	2018	2019
EU-15	85%	74%	81%	46%
EU-13	75%	33%	58%	33%
AC	33%	33%	17%	67%

Table 2b: Attendance of participants (country) at WG meetings in % along geographical distribution. Count is per country. 2016 and 2019 only one data point.

Geographical distribution	2016	2017	2018	2019
Western Europe	67%	67%	58%	17%
Northern Europe	100%	71%	88%	63%
Eastern Europe	50%	11%	33%	33%
Southern Europe	67%	67%	83%	33%
Non-European	0%	33%	0%	100%

III. ROLES IN THE WORKING GROUP

'Roles' refers to the main role a person has in the group. People can have a combination of different roles. P=Policy representative, E=Expert, S=Stakeholder representative, F=Funder, or a combination of two roles. Combinations are aggregated to either P, F, E or S.




Figure 3a: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2016.




Figure 3b: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2017.




Figure 3c: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2018.




Figure 3d: Roles of country participants in the WG in 2019.




Figure 4a: Roles of the country participants and the observers in the WG in 2016.




Figure 4b: Roles of the country participants and the observers in the WG in 2017.




Figure 4c: Roles of the country participants and the observers in the WG in 2018.




Figure 4d: Roles of the country participants and the observers in the WG in 2019.

IV. TRENDS




Figure 4a: Development of country participation along political association from 2016 to 2019.




Figure 4b: Development of role participation of country participants and observers from 2016 to 2019.

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